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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the effects of government size and of the composition of public 
expenditure on economic development.  Using the system-GMM estimator for linear 
dynamic panel data models, on a sample covering up to 156 countries and 5-year periods 
from 1980 to 2010, we find that government size as a percentage of GDP has a quadratic 
(inverted U-shaped) effect on the growth rate of the Human Development Index (HDI). 
This effect is especially pronounced in developed and high income countries. We also find 
that the composition of public expenditure affects development, with the share of five 
subcomponents exhibiting non-linear relationships with HDI growth. 
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1. Introduction 
How can a country become economically more developed? Why, in 2010, an 
inhabitant of Liechtenstein lived with $222 per day, while a Zimbabwean lived with only 
$0.48?
1
 Why is life expectancy 83 years for a Japanese and only 45 years for an Afghan? 
In addition to the wide differences between developed and developing countries, there are 
also dissimilarities within each group of countries. Since among the functions of 
government are the redistribution of income among citizens and the access of everyone to 
education and health, differences in the size of government and in the composition of 
public expenditure across countries may help explain differences in development.  
Although the government has grown incredibly and sometimes dramatically in most 
countries, government size growth is neither a recent phenomenon nor a simple one. 
Governments must promote social development and economic growth, but it is hard to 
determine if an increase in public intervention by increasing public spending will have a 
positive impact on economic performance. Economic growth is necessary for economic 
development, but income distribution and the economic structure are also determinants of 
the level of development. Therefore, studying only the impact of public spending on 
economic growth is a somewhat partial analysis.  
There are many studies on the effects of government expenditures on economic 
growth, but the literature analyzing the effects on economic development is much scarcer. 
Furthermore, there is a very reduced number of studies examining the growth effects of 
the composition of public expenditure using samples that cover developing countries and 
data since the 1970s. This is essentially due to the fact that the historical fiscal data 
reported to the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics follows two different classification 
standards which are hard to combine. Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) have 
recently merged GFSM1986 and GFSM2001 to assemble a new dataset which covers th e 
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 Just over a third of the poverty line of $1 25 per day. Values obtained from UNDP (2011). 
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period 1970-2010. They then analyze the effects of public expenditure reallocations in 
long-run economic growth and conclude that increases in the share of education spendi ng 
tend to be growth-enhancing.
2
 
The main objective of the present study is to fill an important gap in the literature 
by empirically examining the effects of government size and of expenditure composition 
on economic development. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have 
analyzed the effects of expenditure composition on economic development. We perform 
system-GMM estimations for a linear dynamic panel data model using a sample that 
covers up to 156 countries,
3
 for consecutive and non-overlapping 5-year periods from 
1980 to 2010. The dependent variable is the growth rate of the UNCTAD’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) over a 5-year period. Our results indicate that government size 
has a quadratic (inverted U-shaped) effect on the HDI growth rate, especially in developed 
and high income countries. Thus, in these countries, excessive government size is 
detrimental to economic development. Regarding expenditure composition, we find that 
the shares of defense, education and social protection expense in total public expenditure 
have U-shaped relationships with development, while health and the group of remaining 
expenses have inverted U-shaped relationships. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes the literature on 
government size and economic development, also comprising the literature which relates 
government size with economic performance. The data and the empirical model are 
presented in section 3, and the results are shown and discussed in section 4. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in section 5. 
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 Kneller et al. (1999) empirically analyze the effects of the structure of taxation and public expenditure on economic 
growth for a sample of 22 OECD countries. They find that distortionary taxation reduces growth, whilst non-
distortionary taxation does not, and that productive public expenditure enhances growth, whilst non-productive 
expenditure does not. 
3
 When using data on public expenditure composition, the estimations cover 79 countries. 
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2. Government size and economic performance 
2.1 Government size 
Despite the growth of government in the last fifty years, this is neither a recent nor a 
simple phenomenon. Government, in greater or lesser extent and clarity, centralized or 
not, is present in almost all daily activities. It is possible to compare in time and between 
countries the relative size of governments or even the efficiency of some activities, but it 
is not possible to say in absolute when there is excessive government. Comparing 
observations requires some care, especially when comparing over time, as they have to be 
adjusted to inflation and demographic growth (Ulbrich 2003). The most common and less 
disadvantageous variable to measure government size is public expenditure
4
 as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
The size and role of government have always been closely linked: changes in the 
growth of government were related to changes in its role in the economy. Since the late 
nineteenth century that public expenditures have been increasing considerably, on 
average,
5
 but more rapidly in the period before 1980 (Peltzman 1980; Tanzi and 
Schuknecht 2000). It was a protective and welfare state government, seeking for a greater 
redistribution of income and wealth from the richest to the poorest, playing roles that the 
markets alone could or would not play, such as the provision of public goods and services 
and the mitigation of externalities. A growing skepticism about governmental intervention 
in the economy and the view of the public sector as "excessive" and expensive, and as a 
welfare state that creates disincentives to private initiative through high taxes, are among 
the explanations for the slowdown of public expenditure after 1980. 
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 Public expenditure is less volatile and less susceptible to measurement errors than public revenue 
(Labonte 2010).  
5 
On average, considering there is an asymmetry in government growth. For example, faster development of public 
expenditure in less institutionally constrained countries. 
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2.2 Economic development 
Because of their strict relationship, economic development is often confused with 
economic growth (see Pomfret 1997). Actually, they are quite different. Economic 
development can be defined as a qualitative change and restructuring of a country, 
reflecting not only technological progress, but also social progress. In turn, economic 
growth can be defined as a quantitative change in a country’s economy, measured by 
changes in GDP over one year. Nevertheless, despite these differences, GDP and economic 
growth are the most commonly used indicators of economic development. 
Economic growth is necessary but not sufficient for economic development: the 
income distribution and economic structure are also examples of essential indicators of 
economic development (Nafziger 2006). It is not correct to say that a country has 
developed economically just because its GDP per capita has increased, when a great part 
of the population still lives in precarious conditions.  For Seers (1969), the income level 
only represents the potential for economic development; to register economic development 
it is essential to verify reductions of poverty, unemployment and inequality in a country. 
That is, a country may be rich but not necessarily developed.  
Defining and measuring economic development is still a problem that generates as 
much controversy as measuring government size. There isn’t a proper measure, but some 
that may be more plausible and acceptable than others. Faced with this measurement 
problem, several alternatives were developed to measure the welfare of a population , 
combining several indicators of economic development. The most commonly accepted is 
the Human Development Index (HDI).  The HDI was first developed by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) in 1990, stating that the differences between developed 
and developing countries were smaller when measured by human development than by the 
simple comparison of per capita income. According to the Human Development Report 
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(UNDP 2011), this is a summary index that results from the geometric mean
6
 of three 
basic dimensions of human development: (1) long and healthy life, (2) access to 
knowledge and education, and (3) decent and stable living standards. To each of the 
indices included, the maximum value (observed) and minimum value (observed or not) are 
assigned, resulting in the index value
7
 for each country i in year t as explained in the 
Appendix. 
The HDI also presents some limitations, such as scaling index values between 0 and 
1, the weight assigned to each of the basic dimensions, or difficulties encountered when 
comparing countries by other factors related to the enrollment rate, such as quality of 
schools or dropout rates, which vary substantially from year to year. Nevertheless, 
Nafziger (2006) considers that the HDI is better, more complete and multifaceted than any 
other indicator or index, being useful for the qualitative aspects of development, 
influencing countries with low levels of development to review their policies of nutrition, 
health and education. In this sense, the HDI is the indicator used in the present study to 
compare countries regarding their levels of development. 
 
2.3 Effects on economic growth and development 
Since economic growth is a common indicator of economic development, it is 
important to take the impact of government size on economic growth into account. This 
literature is immense, as many authors dedicated attention to it and found a variety of 
results. Therefore, we describe only a small part of the existing literature.  
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 The authors argue for the replacement of the arithmetic mean (used in previous reports) by the geometric mean 
because the values obtained for the indices are lower, occurring major changes only for countries where there is a 
greater inequality between the dimensions of development. 
7
 As these maximum and minimum values vary over time, every year all indexes for all countries are recalculated. 
Hence, for temporal consistency, comparisons should not be made using different publications of the UNDP for the 
HDI. Thus, all HDI data used in this paper comes from UNDP (2011). 
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An important empirical study was that of Barro (1991). Despite the difficulties in 
measuring public services and growth rates, or in treating government size as an 
endogenous variable, for a relatively low level of productive public expenditure ,
8
 he finds 
that government size positively influences economic growth. From a certain (optimum) 
level on, increasing government size has a negative impact.
9
 Barro also concluded that for 
a given value of the government size, an increase in unproductive expenditure leads to a 
decrease in growth rates and saving; despite not having a direct impact on productivity in 
the private sector, the increase in income leads to a tax disincentive to investment. These 
empirical results are consistent with his analysis of government spending in an 
endogenous growth model (Barro 1990).
10
 Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that fiscal 
policy is influenced by the scale of the economy and that investment in transport and 
communication is consistently correlated with growth.  
According to Gwartney et al. (1998), channeling resources from the free functioning 
private markets to the public sector implies higher taxes that create disincentives for 
workers and investment, inefficiency, low returns, and lack of dynamics and innovation in 
the political process (when compared to the market process). These effects may even 
dominate and generate a negative impact on growth. Furthermore, there is no reason to 
expect that most goods can be allocated or provisioned more efficiently by the public 
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Corsetti and Roubini (1996), in their study of the effects of government expenditure in endogenous growth models, 
ensure that many forms of public expenditure are directly or indirectly productive affecting productivity in different 
ways. 
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supply, physical capital and productivity. Tanzi and Zee (1997) concluded that, by using public financial 
instruments, tax policy can play a fundamental role in the performance and long-term growth of countries. 
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 For other theoretical models analyzing the effects of public expenditure on economic growth see, among others, King 
and Rebelo (1990), Lucas (1988), and Meltzer and Richard (1981). 
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sector than by the private sector.
11
 Other works such as those of Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995), Bassanini et al. (2001), Fölster and Henrekson (1999) and Heitger (2001) found 
empirical evidence of a negative and statistically significant effect on economic growth, 
using general public expenditure. Similarly, Fölster and Henrekson (2001), with an 
analysis for industrial countries (OECD), obtained strong, robust and statistically 
significant results for a negative effect of total public expenditure on economic growth, 
but not statistically significant for the negative effect of taxes. Afonso and Furceri (2010) 
found that the impact of public expenditure and revenue on economic growth (measured 
by the growth rate of per capita real GDP), was negative, substantial , and statistically 
significant. 
Although they are closely related, the variables that affect economic growth may not 
affect (or affect differently) economic development, given the qualitative nature of the 
latter, which also considers dimensions such as longevity and education. In an attempt to 
find the optimal size of government (public spending on consumption and investment, as a 
percentage of GDP), Davies (2009) concluded that the optimum level of government size 
would be higher for economic development (using HDI) than for economic growth (using 
GDP). His results also indicate that: (1) for all countries and relatively low government 
size, there is a positive relationship between expenditure on consumption and investment 
and changes in the HDI. Above the optimum government size, the relationship would be 
negative; (2) in a symmetric way, for countries of high income, but with low values of 
government size, the relationship would be negative. Going beyond the optimum point (in 
this case the minimum point), then the relationship would be positive.
12
 Yavas (1998) 
argued that this relationship is due to the strong need for provision of infrastructure and 
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 See also Hauner and Kyobe (2010) and Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005), who empirically analyzed the 
efficiency and performance of the public sector, finding evidence of a negative relationship between these indicators 
and government size. 
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 The functions representing (1) and (2) have, respectively, downward and upward concavity.  
9 
 
public services in countries with low development, hence benefiting more of an expansion 
in public spending. According to these authors, different effects are expected for countries 
with high and low development and with high and low income. 
Mourmouras and Rangazas (2009) developed an overlapping generations model and 
concluded that countries where the government is less democratic or more elitist, 
benefiting landlords, who are richer, will face higher tax rates and slower growth. They 
confirmed their hypothesis through a quantitative analysis which indicated that, for lower 
stages of development, high taxes and public consumption may slow down economic 
growth and development. They do not deny, however, a positive association between high 
taxes and growth if there is at the same time large public investment. The authors also 
suggested that, as a country develops over time, the natural tendency is for an increasing 
government size.  
 
3. Data and econometric model 
To estimate the proposed model, we use a panel data base, with a cross -sectional 
component of up to 156 countries and a temporal component covering the period from 
1980 to 2010, for a wide range of variables.  
 
3.1 The data 
The availability of repeated observations (years) for the same units (countries) on the 
basis of panel data allows us to specify and estimate more complex and realistic models. 
However, they also have some practical disadvantages, as it is no longer appropriate to 
assume that the different points are independent, hampering analysis, particularly for 
nonlinear and dynamic models (Verbeek, 2008).  
Many advantages are taken into account by choosing panel data for smaller periods 
of observation, especially in studies like this which include fiscal policy variables. Fölster 
10 
 
and Henrekson (2001) argue that using longer periods (30 or 40 years) makes it less 
effective to capture the effects on growth, increases the difficulty in eliminating the effect 
of economic cycles, or the demographic influence on government size or on GDP growth. 
Afonso and Furceri (2010) also add that the information on the variation of growth or 
government size in a country is lost and dummies for each period or country should be 
used for their ability to capture these specific effects of each period or country. 
Furthermore, as the HDI is constructed and available for periods of five years ,
13
 in the 
present study the temporal section shall consist of six consecutive and non-overlapping 5-
year periods between 1980 and 2010. 
The dependent variable used is the growth rate of the Human Development Index 
(HDI), provided by the Human Development Report (UNDP 2011): 
–          : HDI annual average growth rate for country i in period t. It is calculated as the 
logarithmic change between two consecutive periods. 
The explanatory variables included in the baseline model are the initial level of HDI and 
variables that represent government size, investment, health and education. 
–         : log of HDI for country i period t–1. Assuming that conditional development 
convergence among countries occurs, a negative coefficient is expected for initial HDI. 
–           Size of government: average government expenditure as a percentage of GDP 
for country i and period t. Sources: United Nations and PWT 7.0 (Heston et al. 2011).  
–        
   Size of government squared: It is introduced to catch the quadratic effect of 
government size growth on HDI. A negative coefficient is expected, as an excessive 
size of government will be detrimental to the private sector, to economic growth and, 
consequently, to economic development.  
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– Investment growth it: growth rate of domestic investment. A positive coefficient is 
expected, as a higher growth rate of investment should lead to higher GDP growth rates 
and to higher development. Source: PWT 7.0, National Accounts file, variable ikon.  
– Infant mortalityit: Infant (under 5 years old) mortality rate (per thousand births). This 
variable is a proxy of the quality of the health system. A negative coefficient is 
expected, as higher infant mortality rates reflect lower quality of the health system. 
Source: WDI, World Bank. 
– Secondary school enrollmentit: Total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of 
age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age.  
Since greater enrollment rates lead to a more educated population, it should also lead 
to greater levels of human development. Thus, a positive coefficient is expected. 
Source: WDI, World Bank. 
Except for the initial HDI level, 5-year period averages of the explanatory variables will 
be used in the estimations.
14
 The descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here]
 
 
3.2 Econometric model 
Since the HDI in any period is similar to that of the previous period, we estimate a 
dynamic model, allowing for the quadratic impact of government size: 
                                            
              (1) 
             countries 
            non-overlapping periods of five years: 1976-80, 1981-85, 1986-90, 
1991-95, 1996-2000, 2001-05 and 2006-10. 
  : individual specific effect 
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 Since life expectancy and years of education are used in the computation of the HDI, we use alternative indicators of 
health (infant mortality) and education (secondary school enrollment). 
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     matrix of k explanatory variables 
  : fixed effect for period t (one dummy variable for each period) 
    : error term 
According to Arellano and Bond (1991), the conditions of moments approach may 
be used to estimate a dynamic model from a panel data base
15
 more consistently and 
efficiently. This is known as the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). Taking first 
differences of (1), levels of the explanatory variables may be used as instruments to avoid 
correlation between lagged variables and the country specific effect. For this difference 
GMM estimator to be consistent, it must be ensured that there is no autocorrelation in the 
errors and no correlation between individuals in residuals. When N is large, a binary 
variable, one for each period, should be included to avoid this problem. 
Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) also suggested additional 
moment conditions,
16
 since, as long as valid, they increase the efficiency of the estimators. 
This GMM estimator which combines the moment conditions of the model in first 
differences and those of the model in levels (differences are used as instruments for the 
level equations), is known as system-GMM. This allows estimating with lower bias and 
higher accuracy (Bond, 2002). 
 
4. Results 
The results of system-GMM estimations of the baseline model are shown in Table 2. Since all 
explanatory variables, except the period dummies, may be affected by economic development, they 
were treated as endogenous. Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite 
samples are reported, t-statistics are in parenthesis, the significance level is indicated with stars, and 
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 Two problems are associated with these models and should be taken into account: autocorrelation due to 
the existence of a lagged dependent variable and the presence of a specific effect for each country.  
16
 These can be obtained assuming the presence of stationarity of the dependent variable (the variable is 
convergent) and the lack of correlation between first di fferences of the instruments and the specific 
effects. 
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the number of observations and countries, and the p-values of the Hansen and autocorrelation tests 
are reported in the bottom part of the table. Finally, the variable that was used as proxy for the size 
of government in each estimation is indicated at the top of the respective column.
17
 
[Insert Table 2 about here]
 
The empirical results reported in column 1 indicate that, according to our expectations, the size 
of government has a quadratic effect on the HDI. There is a positive effect for moderate sizes of 
government, but after a certain point the effect begins to be negative. Concretely, government 
expenditure will have a positive impact on development until it reaches 17 percent of GDP. From 
then on, further increases in government size will have a negative effect on development. Regarding 
the other explanatory variables, investment growth and secondary school enrollment have positive 
effects, while infant mortality has a negative effect on the growth rate of the human development 
index. These results conform to our expectations, since more investment is associated with higher 
economic growth, secondary school enrollment with more education, while infant mortality is 
associated with worse health and living conditions. Finally, since some of the period dummies are 
statistically significant, they must be included in the model. 
Since the results could be affected by the choice of the variable that represents the size of 
government, two other proxies were used in the estimations of columns 2 and 3. The results are 
very similar to those of column 1, as there is evidence of a quadratic effect of the size of 
government on the growth rate of the human development index. The results for the control 
variables are also similar to those of column 1. Finally, the p-values of the Hansen and 
autocorrelation tests reported at the bottom part of the table indicate that the instrument 
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 UN: General government final consumption expenditure (% GDP). Source: National Accounts Estimates of Main 
Aggregates, United Nations Statistics Division. 
PWT-kg: Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices. Source: PWT 
7.0, main file, variable kg. 
PWT-NA: Sum of government collective consumption expenditure and government individual consumption 
expenditure, i.e. gckon plus health and education services of Government consumed by households. (at constant prices). 
Source: PWT 7.0, National Accounts file, variable gkon. 
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set is valid and that there is no second order autocorrelation of the residuals. Thus, the 
results of the system-GMM estimations reported in Table 2 are valid.  
It is possible that the impact of the size of government on the growth rate of the 
human development index in a given country depends on the level of development or of 
income that it has reached. In order to account for that possibility, the size of government 
was interacted with the following dummy variables:  
– Developedit: Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries classified by the UNDP as of 
high or very high development, and equals zero otherwise.  
– Developingit: Dummy variable that equals 1 for countries classified by the UNDP as of 
medium or low development, and equals zero otherwise.  
– High Incomeit: Dummy variable that equals 1 for high income and upper middle income 
countries (according to the World Bank), and equals zero otherwise.  
– Low Incomeit: Dummy variable that equals 1 for low income and lower middle income 
countries (according to the World Bank), and equals zero otherwise.  
The results presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 indicate that the quadratic effect 
found in the estimations of Table 2 may be present only in developed countries. In fact, 
while both the linear and the quadratic terms of the interactions of the size of government 
with the dummy variable for developed countries are always statistically significant, the 
interactions are not statistically significant for developing countries. In the estimations of 
columns 3 and 4, the size of government was interacted with dummy variables for high 
and low income countries. The quadratic effect (inverted U-shaped relationship) is present 
for high income countries. Regarding low income countries, no effects seem to be  present 
in the estimation of column 3, while there is evidence of a quadratic, U -shaped, effect in 
column 4. That is, the size of government seems to have opposite effects in high and low 
income countries, a result that is consistent with those of Davies (2009). 
[Insert Table 3 about here]
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There are many studies indicating that institutional quality matters for economic 
growth (e.g., North 1990, Hall and Jones 1999, and Acemoglu et al. 2005). Since 
economic growth leads to higher levels of GDP per capita, which are considered in the 
computation of the HDI, we expect that institutions are also among the determinants of 
HDI growth. That hypothesis is taken into account in the estimations whose r esults are 
reported in Table 4, where four main areas of the Index of Economic Freedom (Gwartney 
and Lawson 2012) were considered. The results indicate that access to sound money 
(column 2), freedom to trade internationally (column 3),  and more business friendly 
regulations of credit, labor and business (column 4) are associated with higher rates of 
human development growth.
18
 Thus, the results shown in Table 4 support the hypothesis 
that institutions matter for economic development, and they also provide additional 
evidence of a quadratic effect of government size (both the linear and the quadratic terms 
are always statistically significant and have the expected signs).  
[Insert Table 4 about here]
 
Using a new dataset on the composition of public expenditure, assembled by Acosta -
Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), which merges the historical fiscal data reported to the 
IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) under GFSM1986 and GFSM2001, from 1970 
to 2010, we are able to take into account the functional composition of public expenditure, 
at the central government level, in the estimations of Table 5. Concretely, in each 
estimation, the share of a subcomponent in total government expenditure was considered , 
along with the control variables. The subcomponents considered were: defense; health; 
education; social protection; and the rest (which aggregates the shares of the remaining 
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 Since Area 1 of the Index of Economic Freedom is related to the size of government, which was already 
accounted for in the estimations, only the other four areas were considered in the estimations of Table 4.  It 
is somewhat surprising that the legal structure and security of property rights does not seem to affect 
economic development.  
16 
 
subcomponents). Although further disaggregation would be possible, it would com e at the 
cost of losing many observations. 
[Insert Table 5 about here]
 
The results indicate that larger shares of expenditure in health would foster HDI 
growth, while the shares of the other subcomponents do not seem to affect HDI growth. 
The positive coefficient of health expenditure was expected, as it is associated with life 
expectancy, which is considered in the calculation of the HDI. The lack of results for the 
other expenditure subcomponents is somewhat surprising. But, it may be due to the fact 
that we are not accounting for the possibility that they affect HDI growth in a non -linear 
way. That is, as happened with government size, the subcomponents of expenditure may 
have a quadratic effect on HDI growth.  
That possibility is accounted for in the estimations of Table 6. Now, there is evidence 
of quadratic effects for all subcomponents. Defense (column 1), education (column 3) and 
social protection expenditure (column 4) have inverted U-shaped relationships with HDI 
growth, with optimal (maximum) shares at 13.9, 11.4 and 26.4 percent, respectively. Thus, 
increases beyond these levels would be detrimental to economic development. On average, 
that seems to be already the case of social protection expenditure, whose sample average 
of 28.6 percent is already above the optimal level. Health and the remaining expenditure 
have U-shaped relationships with HDI growth, with minimum levels at 12.3 and 49.3 
percent of total government expenditure, respectively. Thus, increases beyond these levels 
would promote economic development.  
[Insert Table 6 about here]
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper empirically analyzes the effects of government size and of the composition 
of public expenditure on economic development. To the best of our knowledge, no 
17 
 
previous studies have analyzed the effects of expenditure composition on economic 
development and only a few studied the impact of government size. Thus, this paper’s 
main contribution is to fill an important gap in the literature by providing empirical results 
which may help policymakers promote their countries’ economic development.  
We use the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample 
that covers up to 156 countries, for consecutive and non-overlapping 5-year periods from 
1980 to 2010. The dependent variable is the growth rate of the UNDP’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) over a 5-year period. Our results indicate that government size 
has a quadratic (inverted U-shaped) effect on the HDI growth rate, especially in developed 
and high income countries. Thus, in these countries, excessive government size is 
detrimental to economic development. Regarding expenditure composition, we find that 
the shares of defense, education and social protection expense in total public expenditure 
have U-shaped relationships with development, while health and the aggregated remaining 
expenses have inverted U-shaped relationships. The latter may result from the fact that 
those remaining expenditures include transport and communication, which is generally 
regarded as productive and growth-inducing expenditure. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
HDI growth rate 618 .009 .008 -.047 .073 
Log(HDI) (-1) 618 -.588 .376 -180 -.070 
Size of government (UN) 610 .156 .064 .025 .729 
Size of government (PWT-KG) 618 .105 .059 .026 .620 
Size of government (PWT-NA) 618 .153 .193 .014 .860 
Investment growth 618 -.016 .129 -.686 .951 
Infant mortality 618 54.491 60.277 3.000 310.500 
Secondary school enrollment 618 67.707 32.658 2.984 155.578 
Area 2: Legal structure and security 
of property rights 512 5.909 1.983 1.143 9.624 
Area 3: Access to sound money 525 7.738 1.579 1.213 9.838 
Area 4: Freedom to trade 
internationally
 
504 6.730 1.829 0.000 9.565 
Area 5: Regulation of credit, labor, 
and business 523 6.263 1.096 2.615 8.781 
Defense (% T.Expense) 237 .074 .061 .007 .377 
Health (% T.Expense) 237 .091 .056 .005 .248 
Education (% T.Expense) 237 .113 .055 .016 .246 
Social Protection (% T.Expense) 237 .286 .156 .006 .622 
Rest (% T.Expense) 237 .434 .139 .206 .848 
Sources: Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013), Gwartney and Lawson (2012), PWT 7.0 (Heston et 
al. 2011), UNDP (2011), World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
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Table 2: Government size and Economic Development 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES UN PWT-kg PWT-NA 
Log(HDI) (-1) -0.0590*** -0.0630*** -0.0611*** 
 (-4.607) (-5.090) (-3.934) 
Size of government 0.138* 0.136* 0.0117* 
 (1.862) (1.717) (1.958) 
Size of government
2 
-0.404** -0.431** -0.00487* 
 (-2.032) (-2.007) (-1.776) 
Investment growth 0.0135** 0.0113** 0.0190*** 
 (2.332) (2.472) (3.823) 
Infant mortality -0.000197*** -0.000209** -0.000191** 
 (-3.036) (-2.527) (-2.408) 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
0.000184** 0.000191** 0.000210*** 
(2.327) (2.544) (2.792) 
Period 2 0.00258* 0.00127 0.00325** 
 (1.839) (0.881) (2.425) 
Period 3 0.000899 2.68e-05 0.00115 
 (0.663) (0.0214) (0.971) 
Period 4 0.00255** 0.00170 0.00315*** 
 (2.451) (1.473) (3.412) 
Period 5 0.00191** 0.00128 0.00327*** 
 (2.245) (1.272) (4.056) 
Period 6 0.00169** 0.00167** 0.00343*** 
 (2.047) (2.046) (5.341) 
Constant -0.0384*** -0.0381*** -0.0338*** 
 (-3.469) (-3.618) (-3.249) 
# Observations 610 618 618 
# Countries 156 156 156 
Hansen Test 0.300 0.441 0.256 
AR (1) 0.0491 0.0467 0.0286 
AR (2) 0.190 0.194 0.202 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1980-2010; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values were used as 
instruments in the first-difference equations and their lagged first-differences were used in 
the levels equation; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- The government size proxy used is indicated in the top of the respective column; 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
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Table 3: Interactions with Dummies for Development and Income Levels 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES UN PWT-kg UN PWT-kg 
Log(HDI) (-1) -0.0634*** -0.0623*** -0.0672*** -0.0782*** 
 (-6.034) (-6.174) (-5.994) (-5.620) 
Size of government*Developed 0.142* 0.122*   
 (1.665) (1.675)   
(Size of government*Developed)
2 
-0.408* -0.590*   
 (-1.728) (-1.751)   
Size of government*Developing 0.0301 -0.0326   
 (0.323) (-0.742)   
(Size of government*Developing)
2 
-0.120 0.0359   
 (-0.471) (0.357)   
Size of government*High Income   0.112* 0.137* 
   (1.815) (1.724) 
(Size of government*High Income)
2 
  -0.303* -0.815** 
   (-1.731) (-1.994) 
Size of government*Low Income   -0.0385 -0.0988*** 
   (-0.665) (-2.637) 
(Size of government*Low Income)
2 
  0.0384 0.197*** 
   (0.208) (3.058) 
Investment growth 0.0142** 0.0165*** 0.0121** 0.0116** 
 (2.141) (3.331) (2.396) (2.356) 
Infant mortality -0.000174*** -0.000212*** -0.000186*** -0.000230*** 
 (-3.083) (-3.384) (-3.407) (-3.329) 
Secondary school enrollment 0.000143** 8.26e-05* 0.000113** 0.000164*** 
(2.538) (1.731) (2.099) (2.973) 
Constant -0.0355*** -0.0237*** -0.0309*** -0.0345*** 
 (-3.355) (-3.560) (-3.396) (-4.363) 
# Observations 610 618 610 618 
# Countries 156 156 156 156 
Hansen Test 0.113 0.473 0.311 0.299 
AR (1) 0.0904 0.0435 0.0864 0.0387 
AR (2) 0.191 0.190 0.195 0.199 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1980-2010; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values were used as instruments in the 
first-difference equations and their lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Period dummies 
were included; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- The government size proxy used is indicated in the top of the respective column; 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%. 
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Table 4: Economic Development, Government Size and Economic Freedom 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log(HDI) (-1) -0.0597*** -0.0596*** -0.0647*** -0.0740*** 
 (-5.753) (-5.100) (-5.368) (-6.028) 
Size of government 0.272** 0.257* 0.167* 0.272** 
 (2.250) (1.742) (1.851) (2.078) 
Size of government
2 
-0.775** -0.755* -0.510* -0.774** 
 (-2.271) (-1.818) (-1.923) (-2.119) 
Area 2: Legal structure and security 
of property rights 
0.0126*** 0.00733 0.000328 0.00733 
(2.595) (1.264) (0.0430) (1.303) 
Area 3: Access to sound money
 
-0.00023*** -0.00021*** -0.00023*** -0.00027*** 
 (-3.973) (-3.294) (-4.102) (-4.662) 
Area 4: Freedom to trade 
internationally
 
0.000131** 0.000139** 0.000156*** 0.000212*** 
(2.456) (2.191) (2.977) (3.622) 
Area 5: Regulation of credit, labor, 
and business 
2.64e-05    
(0.0414)    
Investment growth  0.00125*   
  (1.903)   
Infant mortality   0.00183**  
   (2.113)  
Secondary school enrollment    0.00197** 
   (1.984) 
Constant -0.0444*** -0.0541*** -0.0509*** -0.0687*** 
(-3.720) (-3.243) (-4.022) (-3.520) 
# Observations 504 517 496 515 
# Countries 114 115 114 115 
Hansen Test 0.779 0.216 0.510 0.778 
AR (1) 0.0411 0.115 0.119 0.0868 
AR (2) 0.155 0.192 0.434 0.226 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1980-2010; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values were used as instruments in the 
first-difference equations and their lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Period 
dummies were included; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- The government size proxy was that of the United Nation database; 
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%. 
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Table 5: Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic Development 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Log(HDI) (-1) -0.0369*** -0.0376*** -0.0409*** -0.0369*** -0.0349*** 
 (-8.045) (-6.881) (-6.311) (-4.418) (-5.430) 
Defense (% T.Expense) 0.00809     
 (0.624)     
Health (% T.Expense)  0.0162*    
  (1.710)    
Education (% T.Expense)   -0.0138   
   (-1.303)   
Social Protection (% 
T.Expense) 
   0.00591  
   (0.590)  
Rest (% T.Expense)     0.000304 
     (0.0388) 
Investment growth 0.00922** 0.00870** 0.0113*** 0.0111** 0.00996** 
 (2.048) (2.203) (3.140) (2.504) (2.334) 
Infant mortality -0.00012*** -0.00011** -0.0001*** -0.00011* -0.00011** 
 (-3.172) (-2.309) (-3.367) (-1.950) (-2.151) 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
6.23e-05 6.94e-05* 6.20e-05 4.19e-05 5.64e-05* 
(1.503) (1.809) (1.477) (1.093) (1.704) 
Constant -0.0112** -0.0139*** -0.0106** -0.0111** -0.0101** 
 (-2.155) (-2.578) (-2.050) (-1.999) (-1.981) 
# Observations 237 237 237 237 237 
# Countries 79 79 79 79 79 
Hansen Test 0.571 0.379 0.582 0.556 0.505 
AR (1) 0.208 0.181 0.188 0.198 0.203 
AR (2) 0.458 0.594 0.442 0.492 0.432 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1980-2010; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values were used as instruments in the 
first-difference equations and their lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Period 
dummies were included; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%. 
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Table 6: Composition of Public Expenditure and Economic Development  
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Log(HDI) (-1) -0.0341*** -0.0460*** -0.0442*** -0.0394*** -0.0445*** 
 (-7.259) (-6.744) (-7.873) (-4.610) (-7.807) 
Defense (% T.Expense) 0.0478*     
 (1.924)     
Defense (% T.Expense)
2 
-0.172**     
 (-2.470)     
Health (% T.Expense)  -0.0810**    
  (-2.194)    
Health (% T.Expense)
2 
 0.329**    
  (2.105)    
Education (% T.Expense)   0.0872*   
   (1.704)   
Education (% T.Expense)
2 
  -0.381*   
   (-1.728)   
Social Protection (% 
T.Expense) 
   0.0437*  
   (1.874)  
Social Protection (% 
T.Expense)
2 
   -0.0826**  
   (-2.025)  
Rest (% T.Expense)     -0.0457* 
     (-1.793) 
Rest (% T.Expense)
2 
    0.0463* 
     (1.904) 
Investment growth 0.0105* 0.0145*** 0.0139*** 0.00764 0.0135*** 
 (1.865) (4.132) (3.522) (1.121) (2.696) 
Infant mortality -7.56e-05** -0.00018*** -0.00015*** -0.00012** -0.00017*** 
 (-1.963) (-4.131) (-3.407) (-2.439) (-5.140) 
Secondary school 
enrollment 
8.68e-05** 0.000107*** 9.17e-05* 0.000120*** 9.73e-05*** 
(2.126) (3.084) (1.950) (2.750) (2.726) 
Constant -0.0152*** -0.0134*** -0.0195*** -0.0207*** -0.00581 
 (-3.297) (-2.627) (-3.907) (-3.137) (-0.980) 
# Observations 237 237 237 237 237 
# Countries 79 79 79 79 79 
Hansen Test 0.508 0.795 0.380 0.354 0.472 
AR (1) 0.226 0.201 0.137 0.261 0.157 
AR (2) 0.408 0.190 0.459 0.469 0.343 
Sources: see Table 1. 
Notes: 
- System-GMM estimations for dynamic panel-data models. Sample period: 1980-2010; 
- All explanatory variables were treated as endogenous. Their lagged values were used as instruments in the 
first-difference equations and their lagged first-differences were used in the levels equation. Period 
dummies were included; 
- Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples.  
- t-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%, 
and *, 10%. 
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